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Abstract
This thesis examines why coups d’état still occur, regardless of institution type, in some
states but not others. Building off Wintrobe’s and Hiroi and Omori’s observations, an elite theory
is presented that attributes the success of avoiding coups lies in both the stability of economic
growth and a system of internal incentives that create a direct link between the government and
the people. Without either present, the elite in government are not constrained from engaging in
undemocratic behavior and usurping power, ultimately resulting in coups. Using a zero-inflated
negative binomial logistic regression, indicators of economic stability and internal loyalty
systems are quantitatively analyzed with the occurrence of coups in several states during the
period between 1946 and 2008. These findings may provide a new perspective on the dynamics
and triggers of coups d’état.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
The importance of studying the internal forces that can set the stage for a coup d’état has
recently been a rapidly growing area of study. In this study, a coup d’état only refers to moments
in time in which a country’s ruling or political elites engage in a forceful seizure of executive
power (Marshall and Marshall, 2013).

Extant research on political institutions constantly

questions whether certain institutional constructs can lead to an ineffective government, an angry
population, and a future of unconstitutional intervention by the elites. Understanding these
possible weaknesses in the system allows for states to adapt and curtail such disruptive events,
especially when dealing with the threat of a potential coup.

Building off the studies of

Wintrobe’s (2012) and Hiroi and Omori’s (2013), I conclude that there are two important
relationships that must be balanced in order to avoid coups: a direct relationship between the
government and its people through a system of loyalty and the importance of stable economic
growth.
Some states appear more susceptible to coups d’état whereas others appear to be
insulated from such events. Comparativists often look at the relevance institutions may play in
the occurrence of coups. Since the Second World War, democratization has come in waves in
the international system, according to Huntington (1991).

Churchill’s explanation on the

preference for democracy, as the lesser of all evils, appears to have been matched by the number
of states that have undergone institutional change from non-democracies to democracy in the
latter half of the twentieth century (Churchill and James, 1980). This movement away from less
developed to highly evolved political institutions may not be as simple as writing a constitution
and mobilizing people to vote; a democratic government may not necessarily be ‘coup proofed’
just by creating structures within the government that appear democratic.

The idea that

democracy circumvents the issue of un-democratic regime change through the establishment of
electoral systems seems to have become a fallacy of those who choose to believe that democracy
is the ‘cure-all’ for every state. Despite the desirability of democratic institutions, Huntington
1

(1991) notes these waves of democratization are often followed by ebbs of states failing to
maintain democracy. Regardless of any wave of democratization, even the one towards the end
of the twentieth century, coups d’état still occur; as recently as the twenty-first century within
states that have only just started to be considered a democracy, such as Venezuela (1992, 2002),
Thailand (2013), and Iraq (2010). Thus, there must be more involved in such occurrences than a
state’s classification of democracy or non-democracy; the question then becomes why are coups
d’état still considered a viable political tactic?
The topic of a state’s prior history with prior coups is often brought up in the research
involving coups d’état in newly democratic states. The idea that a political practice from the
previous institution (authoritarian) could potentially carry over into the new institution
(democracy) is predictable, especially when that practice is deemed more effective by the people
of that state. In the minds of those who wish to achieve certain policy agendas, the choice to
resort to a coup d’état seems optimal because of its perceived effectiveness, if the system appears
to be either impeding or slowing down their political agenda. However, the historical argument
is limiting in that it does not explain why only some democracies experience issues with coups
while others do not. The research question then becomes not why coups occur in democracies
but why coups occur only in certain states.
If simply applying democratic processes within the state does not solve the problem, what
other forces are more effective at keeping the undemocratic forces at bay? Wintrobe (2012)
attributes the unique relationship between the leader, the masses and economic growth with
explaining why coups occur in some authoritarian regimes but not others. While economic
growth is an important area of study to consider, this thesis focuses instead on the concept of
economic stability, which is by definition distinctly different. Unlike economic growth, which
focuses more on the sign change between each given year, economic stability is more focused on
the shifts in the growth rate of the economy. The instabilities within the market could ultimately
provide an opportune moment for elites to engage in undemocratic behavior in those democratic
states dealing with the occurrence of coups.
2

In order to understand the dynamics of these relationships, let us consider Venezuela as
an enlightening case. Venezuela viewed itself as one of the pinnacles of democracy in Latin
America during the twentieth century, due to their development of long-standing democratic
institutions and successful oil industry (McCoy, 1999; Parker 2006). However, this may not
have been the case, as they have been plagued with coups throughout most of the twentieth
century. Some might attribute Venezuela’s choice of a presidential system as responsible for
explaining the susceptibility, as presidential systems are often cited as short-lived and highly
unstable (Linz, 1990; Przeworski et al., 1996). Others would make the argument that having a
history of bouncing back and forth between a functioning democracy and periods of autocratic
rule may better explain the occurrence of coups in Venezuela. However, both arguments appear
to give too much credit to the institutions and not enough to the incentives the elites may have to
engage. Thus, when looking from the perspective of how the internal relationship between the
government and the masses works and the economy itself, the answer may become clearer as to
why coups d’état happen in the first place.
Venezuela’s experience with democracy appears to be marked with small intervals of
time where the system was more autocratic than democratic. However, after the removal of the
Marcos Pérez Jiménez and his military junta in January of 1958 through mass protest and,
ultimately, the help of the military, Venezuela entered into a ‘stable’ two-party system. By
‘stable’, I mean that there was a consistent switch between the two major parties, the center-left
Acción Democrática (AD) and the center-right Social Christian Party (COPEI), directly
attributed to a pact made upon the removal of Pérez known as the pact of Punto Fijo (McCoy
1999; Blake, 2008).

This pact, signed by the AD, COPEI and a third major party, the

Democratic Republican Union (URD), required that each party would willingly accept the
outcome of the national elections and work together to support a minimum winning coalition in
the legislature (Blake, 2008). Thus, from the period of 1958 to 1998, Venezuela did seem to
exemplify democracy at its finest unlike the rest of its counterparts in Latin America (McCoy,
1999).
3

This period of democracy remained dominated by two major parties, the AD and COPEI,
that chose to heavily tie the country to the oil industry and its success (McCoy, 1999; Parker,
2005; Blake, 2008). Despite their success, like most other oil producers across the world, the
recession of the 1980s affected the industry greatly. Prior to this, the Venezuelan government
had nationalized the oil industry and was taxing it heavily, since this sector had been growing at
a rapid rate (Blake, 2008). At the expense of the decision to nationalize the industry, most other
economic sectors began to stagnate, therefore increasing the levels of inequality and
impoverishment within the country. The final blow came in the 1990s when the president of the
Board of Pretóleos de Venezuela (PDVSA), Luis Giusti, proposed a plan to increase production
that would essentially flood the markets with oil, which runs counter to the Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) goal of maintaining stable oil prices through the limiting
production (Parker, 2005). During the times of stable economic growth, Venezuela was able to
function as a democracy with little to no internal disruptions at the hands of the masses or the
elites. However, this changed towards the latter half of this period of two-party domination
when the oil industry became unstable in the 1980s and 1990s.
Venezuela has faced multiple coups d’état from various types of elite factions; however,
the ones examined here are those that occurred after the Pérez dictatorship of the 1950s - the
military coups in 1992 and the one at the hands of the elites in 2002. As previously mentioned,
the oil industry was not that same as it was before the recession of the 1980s, where it was
growing at an annual rate of six percent at its height of growth (Blake, 2008). Due to the
increase in the poverty gap and radical institutional changes proposed by President Carlos
Andrés Pérez, many of the masses were no longer supporters of the two major parties that had
become ‘responsible’ for the problems in Venezuela. On February 4th, 1992, Lt. Colonel Hugo
Chávez Frias, with the help of other army officers, attempted and failed at leading a coup d’état
against Pérez that was popularly supported by the people of Venezuela. Although unsuccessful,
the coup did manage to encourage more civic unrest amongst the masses and further encouraged
a subsequent coup on November 27, 1992 that was also unsuccessful. However, the second coup
4

attempt was much more violent than the first, resulting in being less popular among the masses
(McCoy, 1999). Faced with political unrest and an unraveling economy, a surprising change
came in the national elections of 1998; the leader of the first coup attempt in 1992 was elected
President of Venezuela, which can help explain why the coup of 2002 even occurred at all.
The 1998 elections marked the end of the two-party dominance as support for the AD and
COPEI declined and a third party was able to garner those votes: the Movimiento Quinta
República (MVR) (McCoy, 1999; Ramírez, 2005).

Learning from his mistakes, Chávez

supported the popular belief that the elite were corrupt and responsible for the increased poverty
in Venezuela in order to garner popular support through democratic means (Sylvia and
Danopoulos, 2003). Upon being elected as President, Chávez was instrumental in proposing new
oil reforms that would stabilize the market, thereby strengthening the OPEC, and encouraging
foreign direct investment (Sylvia and Danopoulos, 2003; Parker, 2005). Chávez created several
programs designed to help the impoverished, including utilizing the military to build houses and
such for the poor (McCoy, 1999; Sylvia and Danopoulos, 2003). Essentially, Chávez attempted
to isolate the government from the elites. Arguably in doing so, along with his personal affinity
for Simon Bolívar, Chávez became more imperialistic than democratic in nature as his tenure in
the executive continued.
However in 2002, as the economy continued to weaken and, after angering members of
PDVSA by attempting to place loyal supporters on the board, mass protests began. On April 12,
2002, a successful short-lived coup d’état occurred. President Chávez was arrested and Pedro
Carmona stepped in as the interim President. Within forty-eight hours, Chávez returned to the
Presidency as direct result of the help of the poor rioting around all of Venezuela and the threat
of armed resistance from a section of the military that refused to support the coup (Sylvia and
Danopoulos, 2003). The outcome of this coup d’état becomes the most important point in the
case of Venezuela: without the support of the people, the elites hands can become tied if they
attempt to engage in a coup. In this case, Chávez’s charisma had garnered support from his coup
that carried enough popular support to gain him the Presidency in 1998; this support also
5

protected him from the elite driven coup of 2002 from being successful. However, while the
popular support is the final nod to the elite that could potentially dictate the success of the coup
d’état, it is the stability of the economy that becomes the trigger for the elites to engage in a coup
in the first place. The unstable state of the oil industry becomes the driving force for the elites in
Venezuela to choose to engage in all of the aforementioned coups, as when the economy was
stable and growing during the period between 1958 and 1978 there were no coups occurring.
As can be witnessed in the popular media, Chavez’s charisma was no longer garnering
the support of the masses towards the later years of his life. Arguably both of the dynamics, i.e. a
direct system of loyalty between the masses and the government along with stable economic
growth, were no longer present towards the end of Chavez’s Presidency, resulting in a second
coup d’état attempt in 2008. Since his passing, controversy has surrounded his successor, the
current President of Venezuela, Nicolás Maduro.

This study expands on Wintrobe’s

consideration of economic growth, putting an emphasis on stable economic growth and the
responses triggered by these changes in the economy. It also builds on the loyalty aspect of the
relationship between the people and the leadership, as often times this is assumed to be
associated with the levels of democratic institutions present.

Furthermore, the proposed

relationship between social instability, as observed by Hiroi and Omori (2013), is further
investigated with regards to triggering coups.
In the following chapter, a review of the literature for this thesis will be addressed with
three major topical focuses. First, the dynamics of coups d’état will be explained in order to
explain why it is an elite tactic and not indicative of mass political behavior. Second, the
relationship between the leader and the people will be discussed based on Wintrobe’s (2012)
analysis of authoritarian regimes and the occurrence of coups, specifically that of loyalty
amongst the masses and rents with the elites. Third, the role of the economy will be addressed
with regards to the confusion it can create among the masses when unstable and the window of
opportunity this creates for elites to engage in undemocratic. Based upon the analysis of the
literature, two hypotheses will be presented. The third chapter will address the method of
6

hypothesis testing, i.e. the use of a count model, and the operationalization of the dependent,
proposed theoretical independent, and control variables. Following, the fourth chapter will
discuss the findings based on the outcome of the empirical tests of the hypotheses. The fifth, and
final, chapter will summarize the conclusions that can be drawn from the study, as well as reflect
on suggestions and improvement for future research.

7

Chapter 2: Literature Review and Theory
While the case of the Punto Fijo system and the democracy of Hugo Chávez in
Venezuela present unique insight to the importance of the economy and the relationship between
the government and the masses can be, the purpose of this thesis is to expand this perspective to
all coups d’état. Building on the work of past scholars, a general conclusion has been drawn that
adverse macroeconomic performance and social stability are key to understanding the triggers of
coups (Hiroi and Omori, 2013).

However, this study presents an argument that attributes

macroeconomic stability with triggering coups, while social instability may be more attributed to
the outcome of the coup, and other social factors may be more correlated with these occurrences
than demonstrations and riots.
In order to establish the proposed relationship, coups d’état must be differentiated from
another important factor: domestic protest. Domestic protest, by its nature, is not a tactic elites
would utilize when attempting to gain control of the government. This does not bar elites from
taking advantage of civil unrest, much like Chávez did after the failed coup of April 1992,
making some arguable forms of mass revolution beneficial to coup d’état but not necessarily a
trigger.

As previously alluded to, domestic protest in the form of riots, strikes, and

demonstrations could potentially affect the outcome of the coup, i.e. success or failure, as
demonstrated by the successful coup that was swiftly ended as a result of mass uprising that
occurred in 2002 in Venezuela.
Once reaching these generalizations, the role of loyalty and rents will be addressed, as
these are arguably critical in constraining the behavior of elites. For loyalty, I am referring to the
relationship fostered between the members of government and the people usually through
creating a system of incentives; rents generally applies to those incentives the elites have to not
remove the current government from power. To better understand the constraint factor, the logic
of selectorate theory will provide more insight, as this theory looks at how risk aversion and
acceptance in state behavior changes as the number of people who become involved in the
8

process increases (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003).

When a government creates a direct

connection with the people, the people in turn begin to carry weight in the decisions the
government makes, as it is to those members of the government’s interest to foster that
connection with the people in the long run.
Although the social factors are important, the state of the economy is arguably the more
relevant to predicting what triggers the behavior of the elites. Scholars often focus more on
economic development as it both captures economic and social factors, such as the disparity
between overall economic growth and distribution of said wealth. However, as this theory
focuses on why elites choose to engage in coups, the argument is made that the actual nature of
the economic growth is more relevant to understanding their behavior than economic
development. The elites are more directly affected by the state of the economy overall, rather
than the distribution of wealth; an unstable economy can create an aura of discomfort for the
elites, ultimately lending to their choice to engage in undemocratic behavior, regardless of the
type of institutions present.
2.1

THE DYNAMICS OF COUPS D’ÉTAT
Svolik (2012) and Wintrobe (2012) find the threat of a coup d’état to be more of an

internal than an external issue, as it is the elites who have the private incentives and benefit of
ousting the prior executive. Wintrobe specifically associates this differentiation with the idea of
costs and benefits in the case of autocracies where only the elite truly can afford the costs to
privately benefit from a coup; the masses cannot, as their benefit is minimal with high cost.
Mass revolution is not synonymous with a coup d’état (Brinton, 1965). Wintrobe’s analysis of
the utility of mass revolution versus a coup d’état is based on Olson’s (1971) rationale on group
behavior and the free rider aspect of the collective action issue, with the latter being the most
efficient choice in changing regimes for the elites. Wintrobe argues that the masses have no
private incentives to revolt as the benefits of a new government, i.e. filling the vacant positions
in the government, are not easily spread across the multitudes of people necessary for a
9

revolution to be meaningfully successful. Thus, coups become more of a practice beneficial
solely to the elites as a new set of elites simply replaces the former set of elites (Brinton, 1965).
Galetovic and Sanhueza (2000) and Hiroi and Omori (2013) find that the elites will more
likely engage in coups during periods of high social instability. The argument rests on the idea
that elites are more likely to have support from the masses after the coup occurs because the
latter have already expressed discontent with the current regime. Thus, when the elites move
into power, their actions are less likely to be disapproved of by the people. This does not mean
that civil unrest needs to be present in order for a coup to happen. The Arab Spring in 2011
involved several demonstrations with varying degrees of violence in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya,
which resulted in the ousting of longstanding dictators and a movement towards more
democratic systems (Khondker, 2011; Weyland, 2012). However, the social instability of these
countries, along with the surrounding states affected by their citizens’ behavior, did not result in
the elites engaging in coups in any of the states involved. Moreover, Hiroi and Omori’s study
does not allow us to distinguish between the social instability that precedes or follows the coups.
Furthermore, in the case of Venezuela, only the coup of February 1992 was met with
popular support rather than popular backlash, like the coups of November 1992 and April 2002.
Although social instability provide a solid excuse for the elites to engage in undemocratic
behavior in some cases, not all coups are preceded by episodes of domestic protest. This idea
correlates with the statistics provided by Svolik (2012), which show that sixty-eight percent of
non-constitutional exits from office are related to coup d’états while only eleven percent are
related to popular uprisings in dictatorships. Therefore, the continued focus on the dynamics
between the authoritarian leader, their inner circle, and the masses by Wintrobe (2012) and
Svolik (2012) lends to the very distinction between the types of relationships encouraging coups
and those that do not.
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2.2

LOYALTY AND RENTS
An important aspect of understanding coups d’état is how the type of institution affects

the occurrence of coups. Coups were often associated with authoritarian regimes, as there are no
built-in means of removing the current leaders of the government if the people are unhappy.
However, there are still cases in which democratic states do experience a coup d’état; in 1992
President Alberto Fujimori engaged in a ‘self-coup’ by dissolving the legislature and began
enacting direct laws to combat terrorism. President Fujimori often sites his overwhelming public
support for why such actions were deemed good for Peru’s democracy, even if they were less
than democratic in nature. In this instance, it was the democratic institutions that were impeding
the President’s attempts to handle issues with terrorism by blocking harsher policy that was
deemed necessary in order to crackdown on these security threats (Cameron, 1998). This
inability to act gave the appearance that the government was ineffective and weak, which is not
conducive to fostering a culture of democracy in this former autocracy.

Much like the

Venezuelan case, resorting to these undemocratic forms of regime change are viewed as more
effective than those provided by the democratic institutions to constituents and such an
acceptance gives weight to arguments like President Fujimori’s.
With regards to these types of democratic outliers, some political scientists point to the
relevance history plays on such occurrences. What scholars find is that this psychology goes
deeper than presumed; to change a political institution, like from a non-democracy to a
democracy, does not suddenly change the way in which people think to solve their problems.
Neundorf (2010) finds lingering effects of the previous authoritarian regime tend to make
acceptance of the new democratic institutions much more difficult for the masses, as they are
usually taught to believe their former autocratic regime type is preferable and good. If the
autocratic regime is the only type they know, their previous experience in handling unfavorable
governments will most likely have been through non-democratic means. This becomes intuitive
with our understanding of the nature of the ‘coup trap’, as once a successful coup d’état as
happened the propensity for another to occur increases (Londregan and Poole, 1990; McGowan
11

and Johnson, 1984; O’Kane, 1983). Thus, if in that autocratic institution a coup d’état was
utilized to successfully depose a government, a coup will more likely occur again at the hands of
some other faction of elites regardless of whether the institution has become more democratic or
not.
Others associate the plague of coups on democracies with the level of control within the
institutions. Unlike democracies, where legitimacy is clearly established in the hands of the
electorate, and autocracies, where legitimacy becomes considerably less relevant, these hybrid or
mixed regimes are faced with the unique issue of establishing legitimacy for the government
with little ability to retaliate or censor the actions of those opposed to the current regime like
autocracies would (Hiroi and Omori, 2013). However, Wintrobe (2012) finds that in the case of
post-World War II, Communist China the creation of a direct link between the people and the
government, or the ‘young’ and the ‘old’ as he refers to them, through reward and punishment,
rather than simply punishment in the form of retaliation or censorship, has been integral in their
avoidance of coups.

Thus, the balance of legitimacy and reward over credible threats of

retaliation and censorship may be more relevant to understanding why coups happen rather than
the type of institutions present.
Based on the observations of Wintrobe (2012) and Pilster and Böhmelt’s, this balance
may better be explained by the two dynamics important to ‘coup-proofing’ democracies: loyalty
of the masses and a decrease in rent-seeking opportunities for the elites. Pilster and Böhmelt
find that democracies are less likely to engage in coup-proofing; however, this may have more to
do with the nature of the democratic institutions. Wintrobe finds that loyalty must exist between
the ‘younger’ generation, i.e. the people, and the ‘older’ generation, i.e. the leadership, in
authoritarian regimes; the same can be said of all government and electorate relations. Although
democracies do not actively coup-proof, the electoral system by design creates a sense of loyalty
directly between the government and the people, as the voters are able to constrain members of
the government through the threat of removal in the next election. Thus, once the electorate in a
newly formed democracy or mixed regime understands the nature of this relationship, the masses
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may be less accepting of elites engaging in undemocratic behavior, as the voters hold some
power over the government.
This relationship better matches the logic of selectorate theory in international relations.
Bueno de Mesquita, et al. (2003) correlate the size of the winning coalition with the level of risk
aversion a leader is willing to have in the case of foreign policy; the smaller the winning
coalition the more risk acceptant the leader becomes, as there are fewer people they foster loyalty
with in order to maintain power. The theory finds that while the number of resources committed
to the coalition does increase as the size of the coalition increases, the value of the public good in
the eyes of the individual member stays the same (Bueno de Mesquita, et al., 2003/2004). In the
case of mixed and democratic regimes, this value can be placed in the vote. As the government
increases the number of people they are beholden to in these regimes, through increased public
involvement, the threat of removal begins to matter more and can constrain them in the long run.
However, if the people themselves do not see the value of the vote or become disillusioned, the
elite have the opportunity to take advantage by engaging in undemocratic behavior. Looking
back at the case of Venezuela, it is worth mentioning that part of the legitimacy given to the
Presidential election of 1998 rests in the presence of a newly formed election commission,
known as the National Election Council (CNE) that was designed to decrease electoral fraud and
create a sense of transparency (McCoy, 1999). Therefore, as long as the value of the perceived
public good is in place, a direct loyalty system is created through the citizens’ ability to cast a
vote that may remove an official from government.
The increased number of citizens involved in the decision-making process does not
necessarily eliminate the issue of rent payments to the elites. Rents, by their nature, are any sort
of payment above the minimum, whereas rent-seeking behavior refers to the person’s demand for
special treatment (Krueger, 1974; Tullock, 1967). When looking at elite behavior, elites are
likely to engage in rent-seeking behavior in the form of lobbying for policies that are financially
beneficial to them or for direct payments from the government. Mbaku (1991) finds that while
democracies may engage in rent-seeking tradeoffs, it is not to the degree as dictatorships. By the
13

design of the institution, the rents still exist in the form of lobbying, bribery through such tactics
as earmarks, and the nature of political campaigns, but not to the degree in dictatorships where
the promise of security or the threat of the removal comes from the elites rather than the
electorate.1 Thus, once t the new forms of loyalty and rent-seeking opportunities becomes
established in newly formed hybrid or democratic regimes, the elites may not feel the incentive
to engage in a coup d’état or lose their ability to do so without fear of lack of public support.
Thus, their inclination to engage in a coup may rest less with the fear of losing rents due to
institutional change and more with the fear of losing rents because of reasons that directly effect
them, such as the stagnation or depression of the economy.
2.3

THE WINDOW OF ECONOMIC INSTABILITY
Understanding why some people could or would support undemocratic regime change is

only half the issue; often times the main cause of public unrest stems from the government’s
inability to properly address the issues at hand in a timely enough manner. The idea that people
tend to be angrier with the government when the economy is struggling is well known (Gelleny
and Anderson, 2000).

In Fossum’s (1967) early research, he focuses specifically on the

difference between the current year and the year prior’s economic factors, categorizing clusters
of years into either ‘deterioration’ years or ‘improvement’ years. Within this context, he then
analyzes the number of coups d’état that occur within the respective types of year. Fossum finds
coups d’état are more common during years of economic deterioration. This agrees with both
Lipset’s (1959) and Neundorf’s (2010) observation that support for the institution is higher when
people are ‘better off’ financially, which can be integral in fostering a system of direct loyalty.
Fossum (1967) finds that during the twentieth century world wars, coups d’état were less
likely to occur in Latin America, arguably because the people were more distracted with
international issues than domestic issues and their domestic exports had increased. On the
flipside, during the times of post-war, economic backlash coups were more likely to happen.
1

The term bribery is kept here, as it is the source’s original terminology.
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With Fossum’s focus specifically examining the region of Latin America, his study remains
solely economic as most of these countries, with the exclusion of Brazil, did not directly
participate in the war beyond supplying those countries who were actively engaged in combat;
thus, only their markets were effected. In Zimmerman’s (1979) early attempt to find a causal
relationship, economic growth and economic decline are treated as separate forces affecting the
occurrence of military coups d’état. Zimmerman posits that there is a negative relationship with
military coups d’état and economic growth, but never tests his theory based on statistical
analysis. Therefore, based on this line of thinking, as the economy grows the people are less
likely to resent the government due to their increasing wealth, constraining the elites from
deposing the executive due to a lack of artificial public support.
Understanding the overall relationship between economics and institutions becomes
important with regards to explaining why economics may have a distinct effect the occurrence of
coups d’état, regardless of institution type. Some would argue that democracy does have a
systemic effect on the economy (Barro, 1989/1990; de Scheweinitz, 1959; Galenson, 1959;
Huntington, 1968; Huntington and Dominguez, 1975; North, 1990; Olsen, 1991). Others argue
that democracy has no effect on economic growth (Przeworski and Limongini, 1993; Przeworski
et al., 2000; Rodrik, 2000; Sirowy and Inkeles, 1991). However, there are those who argue the
relationship may be flipped – that economic growth may have an effect on the levels of
democratic institutions present within the state experiences. Glaeser et al. yielded inconclusive
results to support or disprove their tentative argument – economic growth may possibly
encourage democratization – and conclude with the comment that this relationship should be
more widely studied by institutionalists.
These observations do not disprove the fact that institutions can affect the economy.
Persson (2002) finds that political institutions do have an effect on the way economic policy is
shaped. He argues the type of regime, as well as the shape and size of the legislature, can have
an effect how policies develop, which matches the logic of Bueno de Mesquita, et al.’s (2003)
observations on how dynamics change as the winning coalitions increase. Quinn and Woolley
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(2012) find that the nature of constraint affects the economic stability of democracies and may
contribute to the instability within states governed by authoritarian regimes, as the elites are
more likely to engage in risky behavior when no threat to their position exists. This could prove
problematic for those hybrid regimes where the lines are not clear and the economy may already
be unstable to begin with.
The arguable inconclusiveness of Gleaser et al.’s work may rest in the same issues faced
by many who try to study the relationship between economic development and democracy’s
ability to survive in newly formulated hybrid or democratic regimes – the focus on economic
development. During the earlier years of the new institutions, the implementation of economic
policy can be a bit of a struggle, especially with regard to party politics. The institutionalization
of political parties, as well as party institutions, is heavily affected by disruptions during the
transition (Randall and Svåsand, 2002). Policy formulation may become time consuming, as the
parties struggle to consolidate, and the repercussions could ultimately be substantial in creating a
reputation of ineffectiveness. If the government is faced with an unstable economy, the success
of the regime may be decreased, as the government may not be versed enough in addressing
these types of issues upon implementing the new institutions.
In contrast, this thesis does not focus simply on economic growth; rather the focus is on
how stable economic growth hinders the occurrence of coups d’état.

North, Wallis, and

Weingast (2009) cite another explanation for the occurrence of violence – which includes
instances of coups d’état – that has more to do with stable economic fluctuations. Contrary to
popular belief, the richest countries are not indicated by higher positive growth rates but rather
by smaller growth rates over a longer period of time. These smaller, annual fluctuations may
better represent the stability in the economy rather than then annual growth in the long run or the
economic development indicators. These annual fluctuations are more visible because people
feel the impact relatively sooner, ultimately responding by making decisions about their future
investments. This matches with the idea presented by Tessman and Chan (2004) with regards to
how states’ behavior is affected by the change in trajectory of the economic long cycle; it is not
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the direction in which the cycle is changing, i.e. negative or positive, but rather a change in the
speed at which the curve is going, i.e. from faster rates of growth or decline to slower rates of
growth or decline, that results in a change in expected behavior.
Based on this theory of power cycles in international relations, the visible changes within
the Kondratieff long-wave elicit some change in a state’s response from either being risk
acceptant or risk adverse towards interstate conflict in response to the shift in trajectory
(Goldstein, 1985; Pollins and Schweller, 1999; Tessman and Chan, 2004). This logic can be
applied to the nature of the individual members of the electorate, who may begin to resent the
current regime, and the elites, who choose to engage in a coup, as the theory of power cycles
generally treats states as unitary actors. Thus, people may either be more accepting or more
adverse towards elites engaging in undemocratic behavior based on their response to the
perceived trajectory change in economic growth. However, it is the small shifts in growth rate
change that are more visible, leaving overall market growth less relevant to the occurrence of
coups than the recent fluctuations of the market for the individual. Ultimately, these shifts
potentially endanger the fostering of a direct system of loyalty amongst people, as they begin to
doubt the government’s ability to maintain the stability of the economy, potentially leading to
lower popular support for the current government and providing the elites with an opportunity to
utilize such undemocratic regime change practices as a coup d’état.
2.4

THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
As derived from the literature, there are clear elements that play a role in the occurrence

of coups d’état. An early indicator is often the type of institutions present; however, three
distinct elements, whose presence, or lack thereof, may be more associated with coups than the
institutions.

First, there appears to be only one element that triggers coups – economic

instability. While a system of direct loyalty and social instability are related to coups, an
unstable economy appears to be the real trigger, as it can increase the levels of frustration in the
elites and has a direct impact on their ability to collect the rents they seek. The role of a direct
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system of loyalty has more to do with how the masses handle that frustration. The system of
loyalty refers to the relationship in which the people have some power over the government’s
decision-making process through the freedom to maneuver and/or the ability to hold them
accountable. If the masses cannot seemingly express their irritation in a healthy manner, such as
removing government officials deemed responsible for these economic issues from office or the
freedom to organize and become members of opposition organizations, then the propensity for
such social movements as riots, demonstrations, and strikes goes up. Thus, systems that created
a direct link of accountability between the government and the people by increasing the size of
the winning coalition may effectively help ‘coup-proof’ the state. While social instability seems
like a trigger, the argument is made that it becomes the elite’s excuse for the legitimacy of their
actions, just like President Fujimori’s citing his popular support as to why it was appropriate to
engage in a self-coup in 1992, but does not necessarily need to be present for a coup to happen,
as was witnessed in 2002 for the case of Venezuela.
The hypotheses derived from the theory are as follows:
Hypothesis #1: States with less direct loyalty established between the masses and
government officials are more likely to experience a coup d’état.
This hypothesis focuses on the establishment of a sense of loyalty between the members in
government and the masses. In states where the winning coalition size increases, regardless of
the institution type, more players are involved in the decision-making process. When those
players include the people, politicians are provided with a long-term incentive to not leech from
the masses – regime stability. Thus, in systems where direct loyalty is established, the people
feel their needs will be considered by members of the government when the latter are making
policy decisions. The argument is made that without a sense of loyalty fostered by the
government and instilled into the people, the more likely the masses will support the elites in
engaging in a coup d’état, in order to remove the current regime.
Hypothesis #2: States experiencing higher levels of economic instability are more likely
to experience one or more coups d’état.
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This hypothesis focuses on the relationship between the economy and the occurrence of coups
d’état. The argument is made that without stable economic growth, the elite’s sensitivity to the
trajectory changes creates enough of an air of unease that they will choose to engage in
undemocratic behavior in order to protect their assets. Once the elites engage in a coup, the new
regime faces the possibility of experiencing instances of countercoups from other elite factions
who wish to depose the new regime. Thus, an escalation in political instability can occur as one
coup is met by a countercoup, and possibly a countercoup to the countercoup. In the following
section, the operationalization of the variables proposed in the hypotheses, as well as the
necessary controls, and a breakdown of the hypothesis tests will be presented.
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Chapter 3: Research Design
This study will focus on the years between 1946 and 2008 to test the effects of economic
instability and the existence of direct loyalty between the government and the people on the
occurrence of coups d’état in 164 states. The research will utilize a cross-sectional, time series
analysis of several states with the unit of analysis being the country year and the dependent
variable being a count of the number of attempted successful and unsuccessful coups d’état in
that country year. The dataset will consist of a compilation of the following: the University of
Gothenburg’s “Quality of Government” dataset, which is a compilation of several major datasets
designed to make public cross-national comparative data, Marshall & Marshall’s (2012) “Coups
d’État” dataset on coups, Bank’s (2009) “Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive” dataset for
social instability measures, the Uppsala Conflict Data Program and Peace Research Institute
Oslo’s (Gleditsch, et al., 2009) “Armed Conflict Dataset” dataset on internal and interstate
conflict, and Boehmer and Reuveny’s (2015) GDP data based on the Penn World Tables dataset.
In order to quantifiably test the proposed hypotheses, at least one form of a count model may be
used to analyze the relationship between the occurrence of coups, the economy and the direct
loyalty system present.
3.1

DEPENDENT VARIABLE
For the dependent variable in the study, Coups d’État, a simple count of the number of

coups that occur in a given year. The choice to use a count is based a phenomenon referred to as
countercoups. In the case of Venezuela, the coups of February 1992 and November 1992 the
argument could be made that lack of success of Chávez’s attempted coup resulted in the
Venezuelan air force’s attempt at a coup later in the year. However, this does not qualify as a
countercoup. Once a successful coup occurs, the propensity for another coup to occur increases
immediately, but slowly dissipates over time, as the new regime has time to establish order
(Londregan and Poole, 1990; McGowan and Johnson, 1984; O’Kane, 1983). Thus, once the
coup happens, there is an opportunity that the next set of coups within a given year are related to
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the first coup of the year, creating a chain reaction within different factions of the elites. The
working definition of a coup d’état will be based on the definition provided by the ‘Coups d’État
Events, 1964-2012 Codebook’:
“A forceful seizure of executive authority and office by a dissident/opposition
faction within the country’s ruling or political elites that results in a substantial
change in the executive leadership and the policies of the prior regime (although
not necessarily in the nature of regime authority or mode of governance).”
(Marshall & Marshall, 2013, 1)
Marshall and Marshall’s dataset includes both a description about the individual coups d’état by
state, as well as the success level of the coups, which are defined as 1 ‘alleged coup plot’, 2
‘plotted coup’, 3 ‘attempted (failed) coup’, and 4 ‘successful coup’. As Marshall and Marshall’s
(2012) “Coups d’État Events, 1964-2012 Codebook” notes the recorded alleged plots and plotted
coups can be considered unreliable, due to their questionable sources, and they will not be
included within the context of this study. The observations of attempted, unsuccessful coups
d’état will be included based on the premise that leaders in a government who experience a coup
attempt may be affected by the attempt and respond in policy changes due to a lack of trust with
the elites. Thus, the failed coup could have a broader impact on the government and the society
as a whole (Kebschull, 1994). As previously mentioned, this variable Coups d’État will be
treated as a count variable created by adding the total number of coups successfully attempted
and failed in each year of observation for each state in existence between 1946 to 2008.
3.2

THEORETICAL INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
The first theoretical independent variable of focus in this study is Loyalty. In order to

fully capture the dimension of an established system of direct loyalty between the masses and the
government, I use of Polity IV’s measure of the competitiveness of participation. This measure
is coded on a five-point, categorical scale that increases from little or no civil interaction to high
levels of civil interaction. Based on Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr’s (2013) “Political Regime
Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2012: Dataset Users’ Manual”, observations assigned the
value 0 ‘not applicable’ refer to those polities coded as ‘Unregulated’ in the Polity IV variable
21

Regulation of Political Participation.

Those assigned 1 ‘repressed’ refer to states where

oppositional activity is either not permitted or actively oppressed by the current incumbent.
Those assigned 2 ‘suppressed’ refer to states where some political competition occurs but the
regime strongly limit its participation, such as allowing a far-Leftist party to organize but
prohibiting its ability to compete in elections. Those assigned 3 ‘factional’ refer to states where
parochial or ethnic-based political factions are allowed to compete, whose particularist agendas
marginalize other parties’ interest and the common agenda for the state. Those assigned 4
‘transitional’ refer to states where sectarian and secular interest groups coexist, accommodating
competing interests but have not fully linked parochial with broader interests. Finally, those
assigned 5 ‘competitive’ refer to states where free, stable, enduring groups are eligible to
compete with little coercion or disruption involved. The relationship between Loyalty and the
number coups that occur is expected to be negative, as increased civilian interaction should
theoretically decrease the states susceptibility to coups in the first place.
The choice of the competitiveness of participation to act as a proxy of Loyalty rests in the
observations of North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009) on the importance of expanding
organizations from closed restricted to open access in the avoidance of violence. This, along
with the understanding of Bueno de Mesquita et al.’s (2003/2004) logic of selectorate theory
lend to the argument that this variable captures the dimensions of the Loyalty variable. The
larger the population allowed to participate and the more freedom of those participating to
organize in the manner they choose, the more direct the system of loyalty created between the
masses and the government. If any group is marginalized or an organization’s freedom to
coordinate is prohibited, the more power placed in the hands of the government. This shift
diminishes the value of the public good in the hands of the masses – the ability to have a say in
the government’s decision – and distances the masses from the current regime leaving little
incentive for them to protect it from the elites.
The second theoretical independent variable of focus in this study is Economic Stability.
In order to measure this, the annual percent rate of change in the gross domestic product, or
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GDP, of the state will be used. This variable captures the stability in the state’s market in a
standardized format rather than as a function of economic size.

Using data from the

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, World Development Indicators, and
Penn World Tables, several variables are created to measure varying lag effects of growth,
ranging from one year to moving averages at two-, three-, five-, seven- and ten-year ranges.
These year ranges allow for the effect of several years to be considered; for example, the fiveyear range takes into account the effect the previous five years’ growth rates have had on the
occurrence of a coup within the given year. This may help better capture the degree of economic
stability enjoyed instead of a simple one-year lag could (Boehmer, 2007). The percent changes
show the stability of the state’s economy, as lower, regular percent changes implies fewer shocks
to the economy, therefore implying there are less critical economic issues being faced by the
government (North, Wallis, and Weingast, 2009).

This relates directly with the trajectory

argument for economic stability – the smaller the percent change on a regular basis, the less
unstable the change in the trajectory of the economy. A secondary form of the Economic
Stability variable will be included based on Fossum’s (1967) observations on ‘deterioration’
years. However, rather than simply utilizing his dichotomous coding of each year as either 0
‘growth’ or 1 ‘decline’, the format of peace years will be used, creating a count of the years a
state is faced with declining growth rates. This allows for the effect of long-standing economic
decline to be observed through the count of years where negative economic growth is present.
3.3

CONTROL VARIABLES
The first control variable included in the model will be that of Social Instability. As

previously mentioned, Hiroi and Omori (2013) find that instances of social instability not only
increase the probability of coup but also the propensity of a coup occurring again. In agreement
with these findings, their social instability indicators are included, but are treated differently on a
theoretical level. Hiroi and Omori aggregate the number of strikes, riots, and demonstrations
present in a given state for a given year from Bank’s data and log it in order to decrease the skew
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of the variable itself. However, the concept of strikes may arguably be distinctly different from
riots and demonstrations, which appear more indicative of frustration with a range of political
issues, as the previous may be more related to labor (Taylor-Gooby, 2013). Thus, Social
Instability will be defined in the fashion of Hiroi and Omori, i.e. added and logged, with the
exclusion of the strikes variable. Strikes will be treated as a separated variable and logged for
skew.
Another control variable will be Institutions; controlling for the type of institution present
is a standard practice in the study of coups d’état. Often times, Polity IV’s -10 to 10-point scale
is used to indicate the institution type with -10 to -6 representing ‘autocracies’, -6 to 6
‘anocracies’ and 6 to 10 ‘democracies’ (Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr, 2013). However, in an
attempt to avoid issues with collinearity between Institutions and Loyalty, as the measure of
Loyalty is a component of the assigned polity score, Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland’s (2010)
six-point category scale will be used instead. This scale moves ordinally from the smallest
winning coalition with the government, i.e. the leader, him or herself, at minimum, to the largest
winning coalition, i.e. full participation of the masses with no separation of the head of
government and the legislature. Observations assigned the value of 1 refer to states with a ‘royal
dictatorship’, 2 ‘military dictatorship’, 3 ‘civilian dictatorship’, 4 ‘presidential democracy’, 5
‘mixed (semi-presidential) democracy’, and 6 ‘parliamentary democracy’.

However, in

anticipation of skepticism of the theoretical treatment of these variables as ordinal, in this study
values 2 through 6 will be treated and read as dummy variables in the model, with 1 becoming
the baseline.
Ethnic Fractionalization will be included as this can potentially result in civil unrest,
which may be highly detrimental to the fostering a direct system of loyalty amongst the
electorate and the members of government. The more fractionalized the population, the more
civil unrest may occur that could potentially culminate in non-democratic actions being taken if
the political institutions fail to remedy the issues. In states with lower civilian interaction, the
built in groups in society created by ethnic identity can potentially act as a breeding ground for
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social instability (Bodea and Elbadawi, 2007). For Ethnic Fractionalization, the variable is a
continuous measure from 0 to 1, with 0 being ‘perfectly homogenous’ and 1 being ‘highly
fractionalized’ (Fearon, 2003).
Often times, when internal issues are not improving, external conflict can be a healthy
distraction and an effective tool of making the government appear responsive rather than
stagnant. This rests on the idea that the executive will be perceived as strong, as they have taken
decisive action against a perceived enemy, which could result in bolstering more support for the
executive and, by default, the government (Mayer, 1971; Hastings and Jenkins, 1983). Thus, the
opportunity for the elite to engage in the coup becomes constrained due the perceived
effectiveness of the executive by the masses. However, if the conflict is internalized when the
new institutions are put into place, the conflict escalation could ultimately result in creating the
prime climate for the elites to engage in undemocratic behavior. For both the variable Internal
Conflict and Interstate Conflict, a peace years measure will be used to indicate not only if the
state is engaged in conflict but also the number of years it has not been engaged in conflict.
When the count is at 0 there is conflict present, while every subsequent number is reflective of
the years it has been since the most recent conflict has ended, giving the count of years of peace.
For both Interstate Conflict and Internal Conflict, the Uppsala Conflict Data Program and Peace
Research Institute Oslo’s “Armed Conflict Dataset” dataset will be used to indicate the start,
presence, and end of both civil conflict and interstate conflict. In the case of Interstate Conflict,
both states will be coded individually, as the data is set up dyadically. It is important to note that
a dummy variable, Cold War, will be included as at least the Soviet Union may have been
directly influential to the occurrence of coups in ‘Third World’ countries during the Cold War
(David, 1986). For the operationalization, 1 will demarcate those years during the Cold War and
0 for those years after the fall of the Berlin Wall.
The final control variable will be Military Rents which will be based on the percent of
government expenditure on the military per year provided by the World Bank Dataset, as this
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signals a choice by the government to enhance its security. With the rent-seeking nature of the
military, both in dictatorships and democracy, Mbaku (1991) finds that military groups benefit
greatly in more politically unstable states regardless of institution type. The purpose of investing
in the military for individually powerful dictators may be the result of dictator’s investing in
protection against developing competing interest groups that could threaten the dictator’s power
in exchange for rents or the military itself. When states transitioning away from autocracy to
consolidated democracy, the state of vulnerability the new democratic institutions exist in could
be susceptible to this rent-seeking behavior of the elites while the culture of democracy is still
developing.
3.4

ESTIMATION TECHNIQUE
The preposed method of hypothesis testing will be through the use of a zero-inflated

negative binomial logistic regression. As can be seen in Figure 3.1 the dependent variable,
Coups d’État, consist of a count between zero coups d’état occurring up to five coups occurring
in a given year. The figure on the left shows both the frequency of occurrences of each
individual observation of the count of coups per year in a bar graph, with the distribution shown
as a line. The distribution of the observations of coups in states during the time frame included
in the data is not normal and more closely resembles a negative binomial distribution. The figure
on the right shows the same information but only shows the distribution of occurrences within
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states that have coups at all; thus all observations of zero are excluded. While the distribution is
an important consideration, it is the nature of the zeros creates the preference for a zero-inflated
negative binomial logistic regression over a binary logit or negative binomial logistic regression.
Unlike the Poisson regression model or a simple negative binomial regression model, zeroinflated models do not place the assumption that all observations of zero have the same
probability of coup d’état occurring in the given state (Long and Freese, 2006). Zero-inflated
negative binomial logistic regressions assume that some observations of zero, referred to as the
latent group, are due to an inability of the outcome occurring at all by using a two-step process.
First, the model includes a negative binomial model to model the count process; then a binary
logit model is used to indicate with what the zeros are associated. Thus, those states that have a
probability of a coup d’état occurring but never experience one are differentiated from those that
theoretically have no probability of a coup occurring at all.2 These states that are found to be
part of this ‘certain zero’ group, where the probability of a coup happening is non-existent, are
theoretically deemed to be coup-proofed.
In the following section, the findings of the proposed hypothesis test will be discussed.
Several iterations of the zero-inflated negative binomial logistic regression will be run in order
test the effects of lagging the Social Instability indicators, as well as the difference between the
proposed Social Instability and Strikes variables to the Hiroi and Omori (2013) version of Social
Instability, on the outcome. The variables Economic Stability, Loyalty, Ethnic Fractionalization,
Interstate Conflict and Internal Conflict will all be lagged regardless of the model for theoretical
reasons.

After analyzing the statistical significance of variables within the model and

characteristics of some distinct variables, conclusions will be drawn with regard to the support of
the proposed hypotheses.

2

Considering the distribution of the count, the argument can be made to use a simple binary logit, as there are only
68 observations of states with years experiencing more than one coup. For a list of those states and years refer to the
Appendix.
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Chapter 4: Findings
To begin, the output of the zero-inflated negative binomial logistic regression models will
be analyzed.3 Although several models were run, each with a distinct variation on the lag
structure of Economic Stability, from the moving averages for two-years to ten-years and decline
years, Table 4.1 presents all of the findings for the four regression tests using the two-year
moving average, which captures the effect of the two previous years growth rate changes.4
Unlike all other moving average variables and the decline years count, the two-year moving
average was the only Economic Stability variable of statistical significance. Model 1 and Model
2 utilize the Social Instability measure that separates strikes from demonstrations and riots, with
the latter model lagging Social Instability measure and strikes. Model 3 and Model 4 utilize the
Hiroi Omori measure of Social Instability with strikes, demonstrations and riots treated together,
with the latter model lagging Social Instability.
As previously mentioned in the prior section, a zero-inflated binomial logistic regression
model is a two-equation model. First, a prediction is made based on a binary logit as to whether
or not a states is one of those where no probability of coup d’état exists, i.e. a ‘certain zero’.
This allows for those variables that theoretically coup-proof states to be analyzed, as variables
that increase the probability that a state is a certain zero are directly associated with the states
ability to avoid the occurrence of coups by design. In this particular test, a positive signed
coefficient indicates an increased probability that the state is part of the ‘certain zero’ group. In
Table 4.1, this is what is referred to as the ‘Full Model’. The second step is a normal negative
binomial logistic regression that predicts the counts for those that are not part of the certain zero
group. This count model predicts how the variables affect the number of coups that happen
within a given state during a given year. In Table 4.1, this is what is referred to as the ‘Constant-

3

The models analyzed exclude the variable for Economic Stability, which is a common control in the study of
coups. Tables A.5, A.6, A.7, and A.7 run all of the same models with the inclusion of GDP per Capita. Counter the
significance often found in other coup studies, this variable is statistically insignificant in the negative binomial
logistic regression and competing for zeros against the dummy variables for Institutions in the binary logit.
4 For all model outputs for all Economic Stability Variables, refer to Appendix Tables A.1, A.2, A.3 and A.4.
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Table 4.1: Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Logistic Regression Model Of Economic
Stability, Loyalty, Social Instability And Strikes On Coups d’État
	
  	
  
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Economic Stability (2 Year)
Loyalty

w

Constant-Only Model

Social Instability

	
  	
  

Strikes
Ethnic Fractionalization
Interstate Conflict

w

w

-0.032 (0.015)*

-0.031 (0.015)*

-0.032 (0.015)*

0.395 (0.099)***

0.395 (0.098)***

0.383 (0.101)***

0.390 (0.101)***

0.227 (0.108)*

0.080 (0.105)

0.332 (0.106)**

0.194 (0.114)

0.461 (0.215)*

0.480 (0.296)

---

---

1.094 (0.393)**

1.013 (0.386)**

1.096 (0.399)**

1.012 (0.397)*

-0.012 (0.009)

-0.011 (0.008)

-0.012 (0.009)

-0.010 (0.008)

Internal Conflictw

-0.016 (0.009)

-0.015 (0.008)

-0.16 (0.009)

-0.015 (0.008)

Cold War

0.459 (0.238)

0.362 (0.230)

0.345 (0.267)

0.365 (0.229)

	
  

Institutions:

	
  

	
  

	
  

Military Dictatorship

2.570 (0.462)***

2.577 (0.464)***

2.561 (0.465)***

2.581 (0.469)***

Civilian Dictatorship

1.359 (0.523)**

1.341 (0.518)**

1.337 (0.526)*

1.333 (0.523)*

Presidential Democracy

2.944 (1.015)***

2.930 (0.610)***

2.980 (0.604)***

3.008 (0.560)***

Mixed Democracy

1.473 (1.015)

1.336 (0.984)

1.493 (1.043)

1.372 (1.011)

Parliamentary Democracy

0.684 (0.605)

0.680 (0.632)

0.722 (0.593)

0.773 (0.607)

	
  

	
  

Economic Stability

	
  

	
  

	
  

0.004 (0.036)

0.002 (0.041)

0.009 (0.036)

0.005 (0.040)

2.130 (0.491)***

2.202 (0.521)***

2.114 (0.473)***

2.177 (0.502)***

Social Instability

-0.029 (0.274)

-0.381 (0.302)

-0.119 (0.280)

-0.454 (0.341)

Strikes

-0.352 (0.536)

-0.363 (0.684)

---

---

2.506 (1.107)*

2.378 (1.120)*

2.489 (1.116)*

2.350 (1.107)*

-0.021 (0.028)

-0.020 (0.025)

-0.021 (0.029)

-0.019 (0.026)

-0.015 (0.017)

-0.012 (0.018)

-0.014 (0.017)

-0.012 (0.017)

0.075 (0.879)

0.021 (0.850)

-0.006 (0.896)

0.000 (0.842)

Loyalty

w

Ethnic Fractionalization

Full Model

-0.031 (0.015)*

Interstate Conflict
Internal Conflict

w

w

w

Cold War

	
  

Institutions:

	
  

	
  

	
  

Military Dictatorship

-3.015 (1.646)

-3.006 (1.799)

-2.367 (1.599)

-7.464 (1.849)***

Civilian Dictatorship

14.979 (1.862)***

14.399 (1.983)***

15.580 (1.864)***

12.878 (2.023)***

Presidential Democracy

17.753 (1.585)***

17.439 (1.675)***

18.385 (1.543)***

15.961 (1.680)***

Mixed Democracy

15.885 (1.741)***

15.173 (1.812)***

16.518 (1.709)***

13.668 (1.914)***

Parliamentary Democracy

15.216 (1.551)***

14.802 (1.672)***

15.883 (1.439)***

13.399 (1.665)***

6450

6425

6450

6425

232.44

175.00

210.65

162.49

Observations:
Wald Chi2:

Table includes the coefficients with standard errors in italics. All observations of the Wald Chi2 test were statistically significant at the
0.001 level.
w

indicates a lagged variable

* = statistically significant at 0.05 in a two-tail test
** = statistically significant at 0.01 in a two-tail test
*** = statistically significant at 0.001 in a two-tail test

Only Model’. While all variables are included in both equations, significance in one is not read
the same as the significance in the other. Based on Long and Freese’s (2006) summarization of
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how to properly interpret the model, all coefficients are read by taking the natural log of their
values. However, the Full model predicts the probability that a state is within the ‘certain zero’
group while the Constant Only Model predicts the actual increase in the count of expected coups
given a change in the variable.
When looking at Economic Stability, the significance of only the two-year moving
averages is quite telling. As it is only significant in the Constant-Only Model, this means that
high levels of GDP growth for the previous two years is not a factor with regards to probability
that the states is a certain zero, i.e. having no chance of experiencing a coup. However, it is a
factor when predicting the number of coups a state can experience within a given year. Based on
Model 1, for every one percent decrease in GDP growth over the two-year moving average,
holding all other variables constant, the number of coups per year increases by a factor of 0.969;
for Models 2 through 4 the factor increases are 0.968, 0.969, and 0.0969, respectively.
Theoretically, the argument was made that changes in the trajectory can trigger a response from
the elites, as the masses and the elites are sensitive to these short-term changes. As Economic
Stability is not a predictor of whether a state is coup-proofed, but is a predictor of the number
coups a state can experience, arguably economic factors are a trigger for coups.
Unlike Economic Stability, the variable Loyalty was found to be significant in both
models. For the Full model of Model 1, as the level of civilian interaction increases by one, the
probability of the state being in the certain zero group increases by a factor of 1.484; for Models
2 through 4 the factor increases are 1.484, 1.467, and 1.477 respectively. Thus, increasing the
direct relationship between the people and the government can potentially coup-proof the state,
the probability of the state never having the possibility of experiencing a coup increases.
However, based on the Constant-Only model for Model 1, increased civilian interaction is shown
to increase the number of coups per year by a factor of 1.255; for Models 2 through 4 the factor
increases are 1.083, 1.394, and 1.214, respectively. Thus, counter to the theorized outcome,
increased civilian interaction is shown to be helpful, rather than hindering, to the occurrence of
coups.
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Table 4.2: Frequency of the Occurrence of Coups d’État During Years of Social Instability (i.e.
Strikes, Riots & Demonstrations)
Coups per
Year

Social Instability

Demonstrations

Riots

Strikes

Without

With

Without

With

Without

With

Without

With

1

246 (64.91)

133 (35.09)

291 (76.78)

88 (23.22)

288 (75.99)

91 (24.01)

340 (89.71)

39 (10.29)

2

18 (36.73)

31 (63.27)

29 (59.18)

20 (40.82)

28 (57.14)

21 (42.86)

37 (75.51)

12 (24.49)

3

4 (50.00)

4 (50.00)

6 (75.00)

2 (25.00)

4 (50.00)

4 (50.00)

6 (75.00)

2 (25.00)

4

2 (66.67)

1 (33.33)

2 (66.67)

1 (33.33)

2 (66.67)

1 (33.33)

2 (66.67)

1 (33.33)

5

1 (100.00)

0 (0.00)

1 (100.00)

0 (0.00)

1 (100.00)

0 (0.00)

1 (100.00)

0 (0.00)

Total:

271 (61.59)

169 (38.41)

329 (74.77)

111 (25.23)

323 (73.41)

117 (26.59)

386 (87.73)

54 (12.27)

Percentages are in parentheses. Data comes from Banks (2009) and Marshall & Marshall (2012).

Although not part of the theoretical independent variables, as there is no hypothesis
associated with it, the variable Social Instability yielded interesting results. As mentioned
earlier, Models 1 and 2 on Table 4.1 refer to models with the proposed Social Instability measure
that combines the count for riots and demonstrations but excludes riots, unlike like the Social
Instability measure used by Hiroi and Omori in Models 3 and 4. The choice to do so was based
on the premise that riots and demonstrations appear more similar in nature than strikes, which are
usually directed towards industrial sector policy. Table 4.2 looks at the frequency coups present
at the time of the coup. For states experiencing coups, as the number of coups d’état that occur
with demonstrations, riots, strikes, and all three forms of protest increased from one to two, the
observation of years with any and all three forms of social instability increases from 35.09% of
the time to 63.27% of the time; however the years with three or more coups see a decrease in the
presence of social instability from 50.00%, 33.00% and 0.00% of the time, respectively.
Based on Table 4.2, the presence of strikes appear to not be as common in the occurrence
of coups as demonstrations and riots, as the latter two have similar percentages for the years
present during a coup except for observations of states experiencing three coups in a single year.
For the cases where three coups occurred, riots were present 50.00% of the time while
demonstrations were only present 25.00% of the time.5 Thus, there are clearly differences
5

Although appearing to be a dramatic difference, this extreme difference may be more associated with the fact there
were only 8 observations of three coups d’état in a single year.
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between the relationship between strikes, demonstrations and riots, and their relationship with
occurrence of coups d’état with regards to how often they coincide in the same year.
However, the observations from Table 4.2 do not indicate how the social instability
indicators are related to the probability of a coup d’état occurring. For Table 4.1 Models 1 and 3
includes the Social Instability and Strikes variables in real time while Models 2 and 4 have them
lagged, as there may be a temporal relationship between social instability and the elites choice to
engage in a coup. In the Full model, Social Instability and Strikes were not found to be
statistically across all four Models, making the presence of strikes, demonstrations, and riots not
related to a state’s probability of being part of the group of states that will never experience a
coup d’état. However, Social Instability and Strikes were found statistically significant in the
cases where the variables were not lagged; thus, the presence of social instability is related to the
occurrence of coups.
For Model 1, with regards to Social Instability as defined in this paper, an increase in the
number of riots and demonstrations present increases the number of coups that occur in a given
year by a factor of 1.255; strikes, on the other hand, increase the number of coups by a factor of
1.586. The observations on Strikes matches with the percentage increases found on Table 4.2,
where 10.29% of the time strikes were present when one coup occurred, 24.49% when two coups
occurred, 25.00% when three coups occurred, and 33.33% when four coups occurred. Thus,
strikes appear to have a different effect on the occurrence of coups than riots and demonstrations.
For Model 3, using the Hiroi and Omori Social Instability variable, an increase in the number of
riots, demonstrations, and strikes present increased the number of coups that occur in a given
year by a factor of 1.394. Thus, the presence of social instability appears to be correlated with
the occurrence of coups. However, those demonstrations, riots, and strikes in response to a coup
d’état are not differentiated from those directed towards the previous administration, begging the
question if these social instability indicators are really triggers of coups or simply byproducts of
the coups themselves. There appears to be a positive correlation between the timing of coups
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and the presence of domestic protest, but in order to fully understand this relationship further
investigation into the nuances of this relationship need to be made.
With regards to other control variables, Ethnic Fractionalization was one of two controls
that yielded statistical significance.

Ethnic Fractionalization was found to be statistically

significant for both the Full and Constant-Only models. For Model 1, in the Full model, as the
fractionalization increases in heterogeneity, the probability the state is part of the certain zero
group increases by a factor of 12.256; for Models 2 through 4, the factor increases are 10.783,
12.049, and 10.486, respectively. Thus, the more heterogeneity present in the state increases the
probability that they may never experience a coup. However, in the Constant-Only model, as the
fractionalization increases in those states not part of the certain zero group, the number of coups
occurring goes up by a factor of 2.982; for Models 2 through 4, the factor increases are 2.754,
2.992, and 2.751, respectively. Therefore, while increased heterogeneity may decrease the
possibility of a coup d’état occurring at all, as the elite may not have a clear enough majority in
the population supporting the regime change, in those states not part of the certain zero group
ethnic fractionalization can increase the number of coups that do occur.
The last control of statistical significance was the variable Institutions.

Within the

Models, Institutions was treated as a nominal variable, creating five dummy variables out of the
six-point scale of the size of winning coalition; Royal Dictatorships became the baseline, as it
theoretically has the smallest winning coalition. For the Full model, Civilian Dictatorship,
Presidential Democracy, Mixed Democracy and Parliamentary Democracy were statistically
significant. Based on their coefficients, for all four variables, the presence of one of those four
types of institutions in a state increases the probability that the state is part of the certain zero
group, implying that these institutions effectively coup-proof the state. This intuitively makes
sense, as these four types institutions have larger winning coalitions than a Royal Dictatorship
and a Military Dictatorship.

For the Constant-Only model, Military Dictatorship, Civilian

Dictatorship, and Presidentially Democracy were found to be statistically significant. Based on
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Table 4.3: Government Budget Expenditures on the Military and Frequency of Coups
d’État per State by Region
Region
Western Europe
Central America & Caribbean
Australasia & Oceania
Eastern Europe
North America
South America
Russia & Newly Independent
States
Southeast Asia
Sub-Saharan Africa
South Asia
East Asia
Central Asia
Middle East & North Africa
Total:

States
(N)

Military
Rents

Coups d’État

Total Coups
d’État

Mean

Variance

Mean

Variance

19

3.948

3.057

0.000

0.000

0 (0.00)

9

4.863

4.502

0.333

0.250

3 (3.15)

4

5.529

4.89

1.000

2.000

4 (4.21)

12

5.662

7.543

0.083

0.083

4 (0.76)

3

9.566

54.854

0.00

0.000

0 (0.00)

10

9.743

16.517

0.900

1.211

9 (9.47)

9

10.74

36.643

0.778

1.944

7 (7.37)

7

11.662

78.439

1.000

1.667

7 (7.37)
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12.231

69.393

1.710

4.213

53 (55.79)

8

12.233

71.374

0.875

1.268

7 (7.37)

4

12.267

35.713

0.000

0.000

0 (0.00)

3

12.907

28.164

0.667

0.333

2 (2.11)

15

17.309

104.676

0.133

0.267

2 (2.11)

134

9.983

58.119

0.709

1.817

95

Percentages are in parentheses. Data comes from Quality of Government (2011) and Marshall & Marshall (2012).

their coefficients, for all three variables, the presence of one of those three types of institutions in
a state increases the number of coups that occur within a given year. Thus, the presence of
smaller winning coalitions increases the number of coups a state will experience within a given
year. As for all the other control variables included within the Models, i.e. Interstate Conflict,
Internal Conflict, and Cold War, no significance was found.
Although originally proposed to be included within the zero-inflated negative binomial
logistic regression, Military Rents could not be predicted, as there were only observations for
134 states over the span of time between 1990 and 2011. However, Military Rents appears to
have a correlation with the occurrence of coups when looking at the average spending along with
the aggregate and average number of coups d’état that occur by region, as shown in Table. 4.3.
Although regions are often associated with explaining why coups happen in some states and not
others, the choice to look at rents regionally in this study was for the sake of ease of
interpretation. The regions are defined by the University of Maryland’s regional coding for their
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Terrorism Dataset, as the regional code from the Correlates of War only specifies five regions,
whereas the previous specifies the thirteen regions listed on Table 4.3.6 As Table 4.3 shows, for
regions whose average spending on the military from the government budget was below the
overall average, 9.98% of the government budget, experienced fewer occurrences of coups.
However, the region South America has a slightly higher frequency of coups than all other
regions below the average. This may be more related to the issue of the types of coups they are
experiencing, as Latin American coups may be more often than not perpetrated by the military
(Needler, 1966). Thus, with such low spending, the rents may not be enough to satisfy the elites
in the military and avoid coups occurring in the first place. For regions above the average, there
is a higher frequency of coups occurring in only one region, Sub-Saharan Africa. Again, this
spending could be indicative of states attempting to stave off the threat of coups by investing in
the military to either appease the elites in the military or insulate the government from nonmilitary elites.
Overall, both proposed hypotheses appear to be supported in different ways. The first
hypothesis, which proposes the idea that more loyalty between the people and the government
decreases the probability a coup d’état will occur, is supported from the Full model findings for
Loyalty, as increased civilian interaction increases the likelihood that a state will be coup-proof,
or part of the certain zero group. However, the findings for Loyalty in the Constant-Only model,
which show that increased civilian interaction also increases the number of coups a state will
experience, begs the question of whether the proposed Loyalty measure is capturing all aspects
of direct relationship between the government and the people. In the following section, solutions
to this issue for future research will be proposed. As for the second hypothesis, which proposes
the idea that economic instability increases the probability a coup d’état will occur, is supported
from the Constant-Only model. While a stable economy is not necessarily associated with coupproofing, short-term economic changes were found to have an effect on the number of coups a

6

For a list of states specified within each region, please refer to the Appendix.
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state will experiencing, as a decrease in the GDP growth results in an increase in the number
coups a state will experience with a given year. However, as in most research, in the process of
attempting to answer some research questions new questions have arisen, which will be
addressed in the following section.
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Chapter 5: Conclusions
With regards to the empirical findings, this thesis finds evidence to support the
hypotheses and lends to the theory. According to the theory, economic instability is largely
associated with triggering the occurrence of coups d’état while a more direct system of loyalty
between the government and the people acts as more of a coup-proofing mechanism than a
trigger. As seen with the hypothesis tests, there was evidence to support that direct systems of
loyalty helps to the coup-proof of states.

However, the tests also found significance for

increased Loyalty in the Constant-Only Model, thus increasing the number of coups occurring
within a state. Thus, direct systems of loyalty appear to help coup-proof some states, but for
other cases it is associated with backsliding away from democracy through coups. As was seen
with the hypothesis tests, there is support that economic instability has a role in triggering coups
and is not related to coup-proofing a state. Also, the results show that social instability has a
positive effect on the number of coups within a state; it is not a feature that distinguishes
between those states that can experience a coup and those that do not. While some would argue
that this also makes it a trigger, Social Instability was only found to be significant in the years a
coup happened but not when this variable was lagged, which begs the question as to why so.
Also, the exclusion of Military Rents from the models made the interpretation of rents on the
occurrence of coups limited, as no predictions could be made based on the observed frequencies.
Thus, when searching for answers to one research question, new questions emerge that need to
be addressed in future research, each of which will be addressed.
The first area of improvement deals with the operationalization of the concept of Loyalty.
Although the variable used here, the competitiveness of participation variable from Polity IV,
captures some aspects of the concept of a direct relationship between the government in the
people, it does not fully capture all of the aspects associated with this relationship in the theory
and would need to be further expanded in future studies. In Wintrobe’s analysis of China,
another element of loyalty had to do with the nature of the market system present in the state,
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which was not addressed in the variable Loyalty in this study. For future research, other
measures would need to be included to fully capture the nature of the economic relationship.
Some of these proposed measures would capture how much freedom people enjoy in the
business sector from the involvement of the government. Levels of economic integration with
other states and the freedom for foreign entities to directly invest could potentially have a
positive influence on the people. By allowing the young to invest in their business at their own
risk, it becomes in the best interest of the old to help facilitate the economic growth through
policies that are beneficial to both the people and the government, as the politicians continue to
foster the loyalty these policies create. Thus, there appears to be an economic component that
was not included in the proxy for Loyalty used in this study. Proposed measures would probably
be an economic competitiveness variable, designed in the same vane as the competitiveness of
participation variable, that ranges from increased civilian involvement to no civilian
involvement, along with measures that capture the level of fixed and fluid assets the states
economy depends upon, as these may play a role in explaining the nature of rents and loyalty.
This might also help eliminate an issue of the Loyalty variable appearing to be correlated with
the institutions variables, as the competitiveness of participation measure is an element of the
polity measures of a given state.
Another area of improvement would be to further investigate the relationship between
social instability and coups. As previously mentioned, both this study’s operationalization of
social instability, which distinguishes strikes from riots and demonstrations, and Hiroi and
Omori’s operationalization, which subsumes all three into one measure, were both statistically
significant in a year where coups did occur but did not have an effect on coups occurring in the
following year. In order to really understand the relationship between the occurrence of coups
and social instability, a deeper study would need to be implemented with regards to the timing of
these domestic protests. Arguably, there is no separation from those forms of protest that occur
prior to the coup and those that occur in response to the coup in the Bank’s data, as his is just an
aggregate total of the number of occurrences within a single year.
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This differentiation is

important, as the model is relating all forms of protest with increasing the number of coups in the
first place. Thus, in future research there would be two steps to understanding this relationship
better. First, the differentiation between those forms of protest that come before a coup and
those that are in response to a coup occurring needs to be made. Second, for those forms of
protest that are in response to the coup need to be coded based on whether they supported the
coup, much like in the case of Venezuela where Chávez’s coup of 1992 actually increased the
riots and demonstrations after it failed because the people supported it, or they did not support it,
like the coup later in 2002 where the demonstrations actually deposed the elites who led a
successful coup.

Finally, once these forms of protest are properly separated, it would be

interesting to look at how the cases where riots, strikes, and demonstrations occurring before a
coup affect the outcome of the coup, i.e. whether it was successful or not. Thus, for future
research there needs to be more sensitivity placed on the timing of the forms of protest and their
affect on the outcomes of coups in order to fully explain whether they are related to the
occurrence of coups.
Finally, one more area of improvement needs to be addressed, which is the link between
military rents and coups d’état. When attempting to run this variable in the models, no output
could be reached due to the lack of the availability of the data. All other variables in the models
had observations for almost every state included in the Quality of Government dataset, which
covered all the years in which the states existed during the 1946 to 2008 time period. However,
the variable for Military Rents, i.e. the percentage of the government’s budget spent on the
military, was much more limited both on which states and which years the data were available,
as the time period available was between 1990 and 2010. Thus, this may have affected the
estimates lack of convergence, as too many observations were excluded because of the limited
timespan and the limited number of states observed. For future research, filling in those gaps in
time and space or a new proxy variable would need to be used in order to get a better predictive
interpretation of this relationship on the occurrence of coups.
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Ultimately, this thesis has presented a new perspective for the understanding of why
coups d’état occur in some states but not others. Often times, the association is made between
the types of institutions present and the past history of undemocratic regime change are cited
with being responsible for the occurrence of coups.

However, building off Wintrobe’s

observations from his case study of Communist China and pre-World War I Japan and the logic
of Hiroi and Omori in their study of the triggers of coups, two distinct relationships are cited as
being relevant to the study of coups: economic growth and social stability. However, this study
finds that economic instability plays a role in triggering coups, as the elites are more sensitive to
short-term changes in the overall economic growth trajectories, and a direct system of loyalty,
which can theoretically dispel forms of protest by providing people more of an effect in the
government’s decision-making process, has more to do with coup-proofing a state rather than
triggering coups.

40

References
Banks, Arthur. 2011. “Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive.” Cross-National Time-Series
Data Archive: Data Banks International.
Barro, Robert J. 1991. “A Cross-Country Study of Growth, Saving, and Government.” National
Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 2855.
Barro, Robert J. 1990. “Government Spending in a Simple Model of Endogenous Growth.”
Journal of Political Economy 98(3): 103-125.
Blake, Charles H. 2008. Politics in Latin American. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company.
Bodea, Cristina. 2007. “Riots, Coups, and Civil War: Revisiting the Greed and Grievance
Debate.” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4387.
Boehmer, Charles R. 2007. “The Effects of Economic Crisis, Domestic Discord, and State
Efficacy on the Decision to Initiate Interstate Conflict.” Politics & Policy 35(4): 774-809.
Boehmer, Charles R. and Rafael Reuveny. 2015. “On Economic Development and War.”
Manuscript.
Brinton, Crane. 1965. The Anatomy of Revolution. New York: Vintage.
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alastair Smith. 2003.
The Logic of Political Survival. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alastair Smith. 2004.
“Testing Novel Implications from the Selectorate Theory of War.” World Politics 56(3):
363-388.
Cameron, Maxwell A. 1998. “Self-Coups: Peru, Guatemala, and Russia.” Journal of Democracy
9(1): 125-139.
Cheibub, José A., Jennifer Gandhi, and James R. Vreeland. 2010. “Democracy and Dictatorship
Revisited.” Public Choice 143(1/2): 67-101.
Churchill, Winston S. and Robert R. James. 1980. Churchill Speaks: Winston S. Churchill in
Peace and War: Collected Speeches, 1897-1963. Philadelphia: Chelsea House.
David, Steven R. 1986. “Soviet Involvement in Third World Coups.” International Security
11(1): 3-36.
De Schweinitz, Karl Jr. 1959. “Industrialization, Labor Controls, and Democracy.” Economic
Development and Cultural Change 7(4): 385-404.
Fearon, James D. 2003. “Ethnic and Cultural Diversity by Country.” Journal of Economic
Growth 8(2): 195-222.
Fossum, Egil. 1967. “Factors Influencing the Occurrence of Military Coups d’État in Latin
America.” Journal of Peace Research 4(3): 228-251.
Galenson, Walter. 1959. Labor and Economic Development. New York: Wiley.
Galetovic, Alexander and Ricardo Sanhueza. 2000. “Citizens, Autocrats, and Plotters: A Model
and New Evidence in Coups d’État.” Economics & Politics 12(2): 183-204.
41

Gasioworski, Mark J. 1996. “An Overview of the Political Regime Change Data.” Comparative
Political Studies 29(4): 469-483.
Gelleny, Ronald D. and Christopher J. Anderson. 2000. “The Economy, Accountability, and
Support for the President of the European Commission.” European Union Politics 1(2):
173-200.
Glaeser, Edward L., Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer. 2004.
“Do Institutions Cause Growth?” Journal of Economic Growth 9(3): 271-303.
Gleditsch, Nils P., Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg, and Håvard
Strand. 2009. “UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, Version 4.” Peace Research
Institute Oslo: International Peace Research Institute Sweden
Goldstein, Joshua S. 1985. “Kondratieff Waves as War Cycles.” International Studies Quarterly
29(4): 411-444.
Hastings, Max and Simon Jenkins. 1983. The Battle for the Falklands. New York: Norton & Co.
Hibbs, Douglas A. 1973. Mass Political Violence: A Cross-National Causal Analysis. New
York: Wiley.
Hiroi, Taeko and Sawa Omori. 2013. “Causes and Triggers of Coups d’État: An Event History
Analysis.” Politics & Policy 41(1): 39-64.
Huntington, Samuel P. 1968. Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven: Yale
University Press.
Huntington, Samuel P. and Jorge I. Dominguez. 1975. “Political Development.” In
Macropolitical Theory, ed. Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby. Reading: AddisonWesley.
Huntington, Samuel P. 1991. The Third Wave. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
Kebschull, Harvey G. 1994. “Operation “Just Missed”: Lessons From Failed Coup Attempts.”
Armed Forces & Society 20(4): 565-579.
Khondker, Habibul H. 2011. “Role of the New Media in the Arab Spring.” Gobalizations 8(5):
675-679.
Krueger, Anne O. 1974. “The Political Economy of Rent-Seeking Society.” American Economic
Review 64(3): 291-303.
Linz, Juan. 1990. “The Perils of Presidentialism.” Journal of Democracy 1(1): 51-69.
Lipset, Seymour M. 1959. “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and
Political Legitimacy.” American Political Science Review 53(1): 69-105.
Londregan, John B. and Keith T. Poole. 1990. “Poverty, the Coup Trap, and the Seizure of
Executive Power.” World Politics 42(2): 151-183.
Long, J. Scott and Jeremy Freese. 2006. Regression Models for Categorical Dependent
Variables Using Stata. 2nd Edition. College Station: Stata Press.
Mainwaring, Scott and Aníbal Pérez-Liñán. 2013. Democracies and Dictatorships in Latin
America: Emergence, Survival and Fall. New York: Cambridge University Press.
42

Marshall, Monty G., Keith Jaggers, and Ted R. Gurr. 2013. “Political Regime Characteristics and
Transitions, 1800-2012: Dataset Users’ Manual.” Polity IV Project: Center for Systemic
Peace.
Marshall, Monty G. and Donna R. Marshall. 2013. “Coups d’État Events, 1964-2012
Codebook.” Polity IV Project: Center for Systemic Peace.
Marshall, Monty G. and Donna R. Marshall. 2013. “Coup d’État Events, 1946-2012.” Polity IV
Project: Center for Systemic Peace.
Mayer, Arno J. 1971. Dynamics of Counterrevolution in Europe. New York: Harper & Row.
Mbaku, John M. 1991. “Military Expenditures and Bureaucratic Competition for Rents.” Public
Choice 71(1/2): 19-31.
McCoy, Jennifer L. 1999. “Chavez and the End of “Patryarchy” in Venezuela.” Journal of
Democracy 10(3): 64-77.
McGowan, Pat and Thomas H. Johnson. 1984. “African Military Coups d’État and
Underdevelopment: A Quantitative Historical Analysis.” Journal of Modern African
Studies 22(4): 633-666.
Needler, Martin C. 1966. “Political Development and Military Intervention in Latin America.”
American Political Science Review 60(3): 616-626.
Neundorf, Anja. 2010. “Democracy in Transition: A Micro Perspective on System Change in
Post-Socialist Societies.” The Journal of Politics 72(4): 1096-1108.
North, Douglass C. 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance. New
York: Cambridge University Press.
North, Douglass C., John J. Wallis, and Barry R. Weingast. 2009. Violence and Social Orders: A
Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History. New York:
Cambridge University Press.
O’Kane, Rosemary H. T. 1983. “Towards an Examination of the General Causes of Coups
d’État.” European Journal of Political Research 11(1): 27-44.
O’Kane, Rosemary H. T. 1981. “A Probabilistic Approach to the Causes of Coups d’État.”
British Journal of Political Science 11(3): 287-308.
Olson, Mancur C. 1971. The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Persson, Torsten. 2002. “Do Political Institutions Shape Economic Policy?.” Econometrica
70(3): 883-905.
Pevehouse, Jon C. 2005. Democracy From Above: Regional
Democratization. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Organizations

and

Pilster, Ulrich and Tobias Böhmelt. 2012. “Do Democracies Engage Less in Coup-Proofing? On
the Relationship Between Regime Type and Civil-Military Relations.” Foreign Policy
Analysis 8(4): 355-372.
Pollins, Brian and Randall Schweller. 1999. “Linking the Levels: The Long Wave and Shifts in
U.S. Foreign Policy, 1790-1993.” American Journal of Political Science 43(2): 431-464.
43

Przeworski, Adam and Fernando Limongi. 1993. “Political Regimes and Economic Growth.”
The Journal of Economic Perspectives 7(3): 51-69.
Przeworski, Adam, Michael Alvarez, José A. Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi. 1996. “What
Makes Democracies Endure?.” Journal of Democracy 7(1): 39-55.
Przeworski, Adam, Michael Alvarez, José A. Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi. 2000. Democracy
and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990. New
York: Cambridge University Press.
Quinn, Dennis P. and John T. Woolley. 2001. “Democracy and National Economic Performance:
The Preference for Stability.” American Journal of Political Science 45(3): 634-657.
Randall, Vicky and Lars Svåsand. 2002. “Party Institutionalization in New Democracies.” Party
Politics 8(1): 5-29.
Rodrik, Dani. 2000. “Participatory Politics, Social Cooperation, and Economic Stability.” The
American Economic Review 90(2): 140-144.
Sirowy, Larry and Alex Inkeles. 1990. “The Effects of Democracy on Economic Growth and
Inequality.” Studies in Comparative International Development 25(1): 126-157.
Svolik, Milan W. 2012. The Politics of Authoritarian Rule. New York: Cambridge University
Press.
Sylvia, Ronald D. and Constantine P. Danopoulos. 2010. “The Cha’vez Phenomenon: Political
Change in Venezuela.” Third World Quarterly 24(1): 63-76.
Tanter, Raymond and Manus Midlarsky. 1967. “A Theory of Revolution.” Journal of Conflict
Resolution 11(3): 264-280.
Taylor-Gooby, Peter. 2013. “Riots, Strikes, Demonstrations, and the Coalition Programme.”
Social Policy & Society 12(1): 1-15.
Tessman, Brock F. and Steve Chan. 2004. “Power Cycles, Risk Propensity, and Great-Power
Deterrence.” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 48(2) 131-153.
Teorell, Jan, Stefan Dahlberg, Sören Holmberg, Bo Rothstein, Felix Hartmann and Richard
Svensson. 2013. “The Quality of Government Standard Dataset.” University of
Gothenburg: The Quality of Government Institute
Tullock, Gordon. 1967. “The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies and Theft.” Western
Economic Journal 5(3): 224-232.
Weyland, Kurt. 2012. “The Arab Spring: Why the Surprising Similarities with the Revolutionary
Wave of 1848?.” Perspectives on Politics 10(4): 917-934.
Wintrobe, Ronald. 2012. “Autocracy and Coups d’État.” Public Choice 152(1/2): 115-130.
Zimmerman, Ekkart. 1979. “Toward a Causal Model of Military Coups d’État.” Armed Forces &
Society 5(3): 387-413.

44

Appendix
1. List of states and years with more than one coup d’état observed in a single year:
2 Coups d’État:
Argentina 1971
Azerbaijan 1995
Bangladesh 1975
Benin 1972
Bolivia 1970, 1971, 1974, 1978, 1981
Burundi 1966, 1993, 2001
Cambodia 1976
Chad 1992
Chile 1973
Cote d’Ivoire 1995
Democratic Republic of Congo 1992
Dominican Republic 1965
Ethiopia 1974, 1977
Fiji 2000
Gambia 1994
Ghana 1979
Greece 1967
Guinea-Bissau 2008
Haiti 1988, 1989, 1991
Iran 1953, 1980
Iraq 1963, 1968, 1991
Liberia 1994
Nigeria 1966
Peru 1948
Philippines 1987

Portugal 1974, 1975
Sierra Leone 1992, 1996
South Vietnam 1964
Sudan 1959, 1985
Syria 1949, 1963, 1966
Thailand 1951, 1977
Venezuela 1992
3 Coups d’État:
Afghanistan 1979
Argentina 1955
Guatemala 1982
Liberia 1980
Nepal 1960
Paraguay 1948
South Vietnam 1965
Suriname 1980
4 Coups d’État:
Afghanistan 1973
Congo 1968
Togo 1991
5 Coups d’État:
Iraq 1965

2. University of Maryland’s regional codes based off the Terrorism Database Codebook (pg. 1920):
North America (1):
Canada, Mexico, United States
Central America & Caribbean (2):
Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda, Bonaire
(Netherlands Antilles), Cayman Islands, Costa Rica, Cuba, Curacao (Netherlands
Antilles, Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Grenada, Guadeloupe, Guatemala,
Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Martinique, Montserrat, Nicaragua, Panama, Puerto Rico, Saba
(Netherlands Antilles), Sint Eustatius (Netherlands Antilles), Sint Maarten (Netherlands
Antilles), St. Barthelemy, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Martin, St. Vincent and the
Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago, Turks and Caicos, Virgin Islands (British) , Virgin
Islands (U.S.)
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South America (3):
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Falkland Islands, French Guiana,
Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, Venezuela
East Asia (4):
China, Hong Kong, Japan, Macau, Mongolia, North Korea, South Korea, Taiwan, Tibet
Southeast Asia (5):
Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, South
Vietnam, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Vietnam
South Asia (6):
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Mauritius, Nepal, Pakistan,
Seychelles, Sri Lanka
Central Asia (7):
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan
Western Europe (8):
Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Corsica, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Gibraltar,
Great Britain, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Isle of
Man, Monaco, Netherlands, Northern Ireland, Norway, Portugal, San Marino, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, Vatican City, West Germany (FRG)
Eastern Europe (9):
Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Czechoslovakia, East
Germany (GDR), Hungary, Kosovo, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Poland,
Romania, Serbia, Serbia-Montenegro, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Yugoslavia
Middle East & North Africa (10):
Algeria, Bahrain, Cyprus, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya,
Morocco, North Yemen, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, South Yemen, Syria, Tunisia,
Turkey, United Arab Emirates, West Bank and Gaza Strip, Western Sahara, Yemen
Sub-Saharan Africa (11):
Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central
African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Kinshasa), Djibouti,
Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,
Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania,
Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rhodesia, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe,
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania,
Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe
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Russia & the Newly Independent States (NIS) (12):
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, Russia, Soviet Union,
Ukraine
Australasia & Oceania (13):
Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, French Polynesia, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia,
Nauru, New Caledonia, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa (Western
Samoa), Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Wallis and Futuna
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